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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by William M. Droze*
and
Cynthia Honssinger Frank**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellate practice and procedure in the Eleventh Circuit during 1992,
consistent with previous years, has produced a number of interesting
cases and is often a reflection of the attitudes of the panel considering the
appeal. In one instance, despite'lacking appellate jurisdiction due to the
absence of a final order, the panel invited the parties to obtain the required certification from the district court in order to perfect the appeal.'
In another, the panel delivered stinging criticism to the district court for
creating a policy that restricted the ability of parties to file summary
judgment motions.2
The court expanded its jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine
to include litigation over agreements to forego litigation, and addressed,
for the first time, the appealability of settlement bar orders entered in
complex class action lawsuits. This Article discusses the varying standards of review that the court of appeals applied to its cases during the
past year. These cases may be extremely helpful in formulating the required portion of appellate briefs dealing with the applicable standard.
II.

FINALITY OF ORDERS AS A PREREQUISITE TO APPEAL AND APPLICATION
OF THE COLLATERAL ORDER/COHEN DOCTRINE TO INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS

Decisions of the federal district courts are expressly made reviewable
by statute. The courts of appeal derive their jurisdiction to review final
* Assistant Attorney General, State Law Department, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
North Carolina (A.B., 1984); University of Georgia (J.D., cum laude, 1987).
** Staff Attorney, State Law Department, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Missouri (B.A.,
1984); Georgia State University (J.D., 1991).
1. 958 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1992).
2. 960 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1992).
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orders from 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (the "Code").3 Finality of an order is generally an inescapable precursor to appeal under the statute. However, in an
interesting exercise of discretion last year, the court of appeals in Penton
v. Pompano Construction Co.," declined to dismiss an appeal for lack of a
final order. Acknowledging that it was without jurisdiction of the appeal,
the court nevertheless opted to allow the parties thirty days to obtain
entry of a final appealable judgment s pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. s If the district court entered the order, and
the parties still desired an appeal, the court indicated that it would consolidate the two appeals, dismiss the existing appeal, and dispose of the
new appeal on the merits.' Attention to judicial economy best explains
the court's handling of the appeal in this unique manner.
In 1992, the court of appeals also examined the finality of a dismissal
without prejudice for failure of the litigant to exhaust administrative
remedies. As a general rule, when a district court dismisses a case without
prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the order is final
for purposes of appeal.' The district court in Kobleur v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Services,O issued an order that it would retain jurisdiction of the case while the administrative remedies were pursued, but that
the case would be closed for statistical purposes. Although the appellee
moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order, the court of appeals
adhered to the general rule without regard to the district court's retention
of jurisdiction."0 The court held that since the effect of the lower court's
order was to deny the litigants judicial relief until their administrative
remedies had been exhausted, this case was no different than others fall3. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). Entry of a judgment pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would appear to be the equivalent of a final decision authorizing an appeal.
Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, reh'g denied, 436 U.S. 915 (1978). An order dismissing a lawsuit may possess the requisite finality, even if leave to amend has been
granted, provided that the time for the amendment has lapsed. Briehler v. City of Miami,
926 F.2d 1001, 1002 (11th Cir. 1991). Further, the court of appeals may also have jurisdiction of an appeal when the district court directs the entry of final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all the claims or parties under rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (1990). The appellate courts give substantial deference to
the district court's discretionary determination of finality under the rule. Pitney Bowes, Inc.
v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 706 F.2d 318 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983).
4. 963 F.2d 321 (11th Cir. 1992).
5. id. at 322.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (1990).
7. Id.
8. Kobleur v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Servs., 954 F.2d 705, 708 (11th Cir.
1992).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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ing within the general rule and that a final order existed to support its
jurisdiction."
The Code treats interlocutory orders differently from final orders. In
reviewing interlocutory orders, the courts of appeal are guided by the
statutory provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1292.2 Certain types of orders are
subject to appeal simply upon entry of the interlocutory order.13 Orders
falling outside the enumerated types may also be subject to review provided that the litigants obtain permission from both the district court
and the court of appeals."'
Notwithstanding the statutory prerequisites to the appeal of interlocutory orders, the judicially created collateral order doctrine may also im-.
pact the reviewability of an order. In Cohen v.Beneficial IndustrialLoan
Corp.,'5 the Supreme Court established an exception to the finality rule
in cases where a district court determines claims of right that are collateral to the rights asserted in the action and too independent of the asserted rights to justify postponing appellate review." The collateral order
doctrine applies only when an order meets the following criteria: "(1) it
conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) it resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action;
and (3) it is
17
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
11. Id. (citing Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1389 n.1
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1012 (1990)); United States v. Orr Water Pitch Co., 914
F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1990); Klien v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1304, 1305 (9th Cir. 1985);
Penny v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 906 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990); Hochman v. Board of
Educ., 534 F.2d 1094, 1096 (3d Cir. 1976); 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION

2nd § 3914 (1991).

12. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988).
13. Interlocutory orders subject to appeal include those granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except when
direct review is available in the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The appellate
courts may review interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up
receiverships or to'take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or
other disposal of property. Id. § 1292(a)(2). Finally, the courts of appeal may review interlocutory decrees that determine the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in
which appeal from final decrees are allowed. Id. § 1292(a)(3).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In order to obtain permission, a litigant must show that there
exists a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal would
materially advance the ultimate resolution of the litigation. Id. Failure to seek permission
from the appellate court within ten days after entry of the order complained of is fatal to
the interlocutory appeal. Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 967 F.2d 514, 516 (11th Cir.
1992). Seeking an interlocutory appeal under this statute does not stay proceedings in the
district court unless so ordered by that court or the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
15. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
16. Id. at 546.
17. Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 967 F.2d 514, 516 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v.Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985)). In Jones the court found that
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. One area of practice that frequently utilizes the collateral order doctrine is a district court's determination of the availability of immunity to
a public official. The immunities subject to the collateral order doctrine
and immediate review include qualified immunity and absolute immunity.18 Such decisions are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 19 This exception to the finality rule assures that a public
official does2 0not lose his right to be free of the burden of litigation for
official acts.
Currently a split exists in the federal circuits as to whether a denial of
Eleventh Amendment"1 immunity is an immediately reviewable collateral
order.2 Thus far, the court of appeals has declined to resolve the dispute
for the Eleventh Circuit. In Schmelz v. Monroe County,"s the court cited
judicial economy as a basis for exercising pendent jurisdiction over an
Eleventh Amendment 24 issue. According to the panel, since jurisdiction
could already be predicated on the collateral order doctrine by virtue of
the qualified immunity defense, consideration of the additional defense
could put an end to the federal aspects of the case. 2 5 Consequently, the
court accepted jurisdiction of what arguably was a nonappealable claim.
an order on a motion to modify a prior confidentiality decision did not meet the first criterion in that it did not conclusively determine the disputed question. 967 F.2d at 516.
18. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (assertion of qualified immunity by former
attorney general); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (assertion of absolute immunity
by former president); Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 1988) (assertion of absolute immunity by prosecutor); Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911 (l1th Cir. 1986) (assertion of
absolute immunity by judge).
19. Hardin v. Hayes, 957 F.2d 845, 848 (11th Cir. 1992); Wright v. Whiddon, 951 F.2d
297, 299 (11th Cir. 1992). In Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163 (11th Cir. 1992), the court
clarified that the defense of qualified immunity should be decided by the court either before
trial, during trial, or after trial, and should not be submitted to the jury for determination.
However, giving jury instructions on the defense does not necessarily demand reversal when
the jury decides the case on the merits, or objection to the instructions is omitted. Id. at
1165-66; Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 469 (11th Cir. 1992).
20. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985). Mitchell discusses the need for protecting public officials from litigation and the reasons why an adverse determination of qualified immunity may be effectively unreviewable on appeal. For a general discussion of the
defense of qualified immunity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
21. U.S. CONST, amend. XI.
22. Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1508 (11th Cir. 1990). In
Stewart the court of appeals elected not to resolve this dispute and opted instead to utilize
its pendent jurisdiction to consider whether the eleventh amendment afforded immunity to
the school board, board members, and superintendent. Id. at 1509. The court held that an
adequate jurisdictional basis existed when a qualified immunity defense was also raised. Id.
at 1502, 1509.
23. 954 F.2d 1540 (11th. Cir. 1992).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
25. 954 F.2d at 1543.
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However, except in limited circumstances, the court has not gone so far
as to suggest that judicial economy allowed consideration of state law issues while resolving a qualified immunity appeal 2 In Moore v. Gwinnett
County,27 the court of appeals considered whether a police officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment on that issue as well as to certain state law claims advanced by the
plaintiff: The court of appeals reversed the trial court on the question of
qualified immunity, but made no ruling on denial of summary judgment
as to the state law claims.2 8 According to the opinion, that portion of the
order was unappealable.29
The court has applied the collateral order doctrine to state law immunity questions that are in reality an immunity from suit, not just a substantive defense to liability. In Griesel v. Hamlin,3 a wrongful death action was initiated against an emergency medical technician. The district
court had jurisdiction of the claim by virtue of diversity of citizenship.
The defendant asserted that sovereign immunity barred the claim, but
the district court disagreed. In determining whether to allow an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals followed the lead of the Second Circuit
and held that the collateral order doctrine applied. 1 According to the
opinion, substantive state law governs the application of immunity to
state law claims, but federal law determines the appealability of the district court's order.2 Applying federal law, the court allowed the appeal
finding that the Cohen33 criteria had been met because the state law im34
munity was from suit, not just substantive liability.

A public official's immunity from suit is typically presented in the form
of a motion for summary judgment, but may also arise in a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for judgment on the pleadings.35 Regardless of the procedural vehicle raising the immunity defense,
* 26. The court of appeals has indicated that qualified immunity is a defense to federal
causes of action and offers no protection from claims based on state law. Andreu v. Sapp,
919 F.2d 637 (11th Cir. 1990).
27. 967 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1992).
28. Id. at 1499.
29. Id.; Compare Schmelz, 954 F.2d at 1543 n.3 (finding that disposition of federal claim
may as a practical matter be dispositive since the district court loses jurisdiction over the
pendent state claim). Interestingly, there seems to be no reason why the court should decline to resolve all issues at a single time if judicial economy is the basis for extending
jurisdiction to nonappealable claims. Id. at 1543.
30. 963 F.2d 338 (11th Cir. 1992).
31. Id. at 340.
32. Id.
33. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
34. 963 F.2d at 340.
35. See Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1991). All three motions precede the trial and compel the district court to rule on whether the public official is entitled
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the court of appeals has recognized that its panel decisions have been
confusing, and possibly conflicting, in deciding the circumstances under
which jurisdiction exists to consider the availability of immunity.36 The
controversy centers around the impact that disputed facts have on the
jurisdiction of the appellate court. The most recent expression of the
court on the issue, Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Georgia Military College,37 provides that "the mere existence of a factual quarrel does not
affect the appealability of a denial of qualified immunity."38 While the
Eleventh Circuit anxiously awaits the en banc case that will finally decide
the question, basing jurisdictional decisions upon factual development of
the record allows for result-oriented decisions and trivializes the immunity made available to public officials. The approach taken in Burrell is
the preferable result.3 9
Burrell'0 also reiterated the principle, recently established by the court,
that a denial of qualified immunity remains immediately appealable even
when the public official would still have to stand trial as to equitable
claims."' The court previously opined that a reduction of the number of
claims that a public official faced at trial furnished a sufficient reason for
to immunity. Id. If a public official loses at the pretrial stage of the proceedings, he does not
necessarily lose his immunity from liability, see Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 770-71 (11th
Cir. 1989), aff'd on reh g 893 F.2d 293 (l1th Cir. 1990), just the entitlement not to stand
trial. Thus, the availability of immunity could still be asserted by the public official at trial
and decided by the court upon a resolution of any intervening factual issues. Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F,2d 1230, 1234 (l1th Cir. 1992).
36. Williams v. City of Albany, 936 F.2d 1256, 1259 (l1th Cir. 1991). Compare Peppers
v. Coates, 887 F.2d 1493, 1496-97 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding factual dispute precludes
immediate review) and Goddard v. Urrea, 847 F.2d 765, 769 (lth Cir. 1988) (same), with
McDaniel v. Woodard, 886 F.2d 311 (lth Cir. 1989) (order immediately appealable despite
factual dispute as to conduct) and Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1988)
(same). An opportunity to resolve this conflict was lost when Horlock v. Georgia Dep't of
Human Resources, 890 F.2d 388 (11th Cir. 1989), settled prior to rehearing en banc. See
Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 717 n.3, vacated as moot, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1991).
Further discussion of the conflicting cases is found in the concurring opinion of Chief Judge
Tjoflat in Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1535-38 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1003 (1991).
37. 970 F.2d 785 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 978 F,2d 718 (1992).
38. 970 F.2d at 787-88.
39.. Id.
40. Id.
41. Green v. Brantley, 941 F.2d 1146 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Qualified immunity does
not protect officials from equitable claims. Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 787 (11th Cir.
1988), abrogated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). A panel of the court in Green v.
Brantley, 895 F.2d 1387 (lth Cir. 1990), dismissed an appeal based on qualified immunity
stating that since the public official would stand trial on the equitable claims regardless of
the outcome of the qualified immunity decision, no reason existed to hear the appeal. The
en banc court in Green v. Brantley, 941 F.2d 1146 (1 2th Cir. 1991), disagreed with the panel
and allowed the appeal. According to the en banc opinion, dismissing the appeal due to the
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allowing an appeal even though it might not be dispositive of the entire
case. 2 Although the panel relied upon its recent decision to permit the
appeal, it also pointed out that the particular defendants involved were
not all subject to the remaining equitable claims providing further support for allowing the appeal despite such claims.'
Another area in which the court has applied the collateral order doctrine is the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." Generally, immediate appeals are limited to nonparties
who are sanctioned and might not otherwise be able to obtain review of
the decision.'" In a unique case decided last year, the court permitted a
party to prosecute an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order
doctrine.
In Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp. v. Banton, Inc.," a collage
of contract, tort, and fraud claims were brought against the Bantons and
nine other defendants in Alabama state court. The case was removed to
federal court on diversity grounds. Transamerica filed a motion for summary judgment against Ms. Banton and a motion for default judgment
against Mr. Banton' Meanwhile, the Bantons initiated a suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983' in a Wisconsin state court against Transamerica. In response to the second suit, Transamerica sought to enjoin the state court
action and requested sanctions. As a sanction, the district court granted
the pending motions against the Bantons."
In determining whether it had jurisdiction of the appeal, the court applied a "practical, not technical approach.' 4 Rather than focusing on the
party. versus nonparty distinction, the court read the third prong of the
Cohen analysis as requiring an effectively unreviewable sanction order."
It found the order in this case to be effectively unreviewable. According
to the court,

existence of equitable claims would invite litigants to invent equitable claims simply to preclude interlocutory review. Id. at 1152.
42. 941 F.2d at 1147.
43. Burrell, 970 F.2d at 788.
44. DeSisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 763 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 952 (1990). In DeSisto the court found the first two prongs of Cohen easily met, but
based satisfaction of the third prong on the fact that the attorney sanctioned was not a
party and thus might not be able to seek review.
45. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Banton, Inc., 970 F.2d 810, 814 (11th Cir.
1992).
46. Id. at 810.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
48. ,970 F.2d at 812-13.
49. Id. at, 815.
50. Id,
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[wie again emphasize the unique circumstances of this case. In particular, we stress that this case differs from the many cases in which a sanction imposed upon a party, such as attorneys' fees and costs, does not
effectively cut off the party from the underlying suit. It more closely resembles cases in which non-parties face the distinct possibility of never
having a sanction order reviewed.5'
Thus, under the unusual circumstances presented in this case, it appears
that immediate review of a decision to sanction a party to a lawsuit will
be available under the collateral order doctrine, provided that the order is
effectively unreviewable following a final judgment.
In keeping with its practical approach to jurisdictional questions under
the collateral order doctrine, the court of appeals broadened its jurisdiction to include a new class of cases in the past year. The question before
the court in Forbus v.Sears, Roebuck & Co., " was whether an immediate
appeal would lie from a district court's order denying enforcement of an
agreement to forego litigation. Some Sears employees accepted early retirement and executed a release and waiver in conjunction with their severance package. Sears subsequently restructured its operations such that
early retirement for the substantial portion of the work force at the employment location became unnecessary. The employees requested their
jobs back and Sears accommodated the requests with limited exceptions.
The workers who were not given positions filed an age discrimination action against the retailer. The district court denied Sears' motion for summary judgment based on the releases, but refused to certify the decision
for interlocutory appeal. Sears appealed. 3
Following decisions of the Fifth and Second Circuits, the court of appeals determined that the collateral order doctrine "should be applied to
review an interlocutory order which denies enforcement of an agreement
to forego litigation."" The court found that the district court's order was
"the final word on whether Sears could avoid litigation,"" that the issue
of the releases was separate and distinct from the retirees' underlying
claims, and that repudiation of a contract not to be sued is effectively
unreviewable after the lawsuit has been concluded." In light of these
findings, the court of appeals held that the district court's refusal to enforce the releases was a collateral order subject to immediate review despite its interlocutory nature.5 7
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
958 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1039.
Id.
Id,at 1039-40.
Id.
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Judge Cox dissented from the majority opinion.58 According to the dissent, the right not to be sued when based upon a private agreement is not
sufficiently important to warrant an immediate interlocutory appeal."O
Further, Judge Cox raised concerns about creating another category of
cases with immediate appealability."' These concerns were founded on
Supreme Court precedent holding that courts should construe the collateral order doctrine narrowly, and that the right to be free from suit must
be based upon some explicit constitutional or statutory guarantee."
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AS APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS
1992 CASES

Il.

Many cases decided in 1992 discuss what standard the appellate court
will employ in reviewing the district court's decision. The extent of review
depends on the nature of the alleged error and whether the proceeding
below was a jury or nonjury trial. The broadest scope of review is for
errors of law since the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial
court to decide legal questions; indeed, guiding the lower courts on questions of law is one of the appellate court's primary functions.
The appellate court conducts a de novo or plenary review of questions
of law. 2 The court of appeals sometimes expresses this principle by stating that it will review the question by applying the same standard as the
district court. 3 This is true when the appellate court reviews the grant of
summary judgment,6 4 or judgment notwithstanding the verdict
("JNOV"), s5 or a motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed a
58. Id. at 1042.
59. Id. at 1044.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1043.
62. See Therrell v. Georgia Marble Holdings Corp., 960 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1992);
Fuente Cigar, Ltd. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 961 F.2d 1558 (l1th Cir. 1992).
63. For instance, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court of appeals reviews

the evidence and all the factual inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion and all factual doubts are resolved in favor of the non-movant. Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1992).
64.

Goree v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 958 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1992); RJR Nabisco, Inc.

v. United States, 955 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992); Sammons v.Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir.
1992).
65. LaRoche Indus., Inc. v. AIG Risk Management, Inc., 959 F.2d 189 (1I1th Cir. 1992);
Bankatlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1992); Gean v.
Cling Surface Co., 971 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1992). In reviewing the denial of JNOV, the
appellate court considers all of the evidence, but in "a light most favorable to the nonmovant.. . . land] will reverse only 'if the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.'"
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district court's grant of JNOV in the products liability case of Gean v.
Cling Surface Co.07 The appellate court found that the evidence supported the jury's findings that the manufacturer of a conveyor belt drive
pulley had a duty to warn the purchaser of potential belt slippage under
certain conditions, that the manufacturer's failure to warn was the proximate cause of the worker's injuries, and that the worker did not assume
the risk." Reversal of the JNOV order and the reinstatement of the judgment were appropriate because substantial evidence showed that the
worker failed to appreciate, and was incapable of appreciating, the danger
involved in operating the pulley as he had."
Other legal questions reviewed de novo in 1992 include: contract interpretation and construction of an indemnity agreement; 70 a government
employee's entitlement to a qualified immunity defense; 7' the correct
statute of limitations to apply in a diversity case; 72 the entry of a directed
verdict;" 3 dismissal for lack of in personam jurisdiction; 74 the district
court's jurisdiction to entertain suit; 5 conclusions on res judicata and collateral estoppel; 76 dismissal of ERISA claim for failure to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations;77 and dismissal for failure to state a
78
claim.
The appellate court's review of fact determinations is much more restricted than its review of legal questions. The court gives greater deference to the factual determinations of the lower court since the entire trial
cannot be recreated on appeal. The court overturns findings of fact only if
they are "clearly erroneous." '7 9 Examples of factual findings subject to
this standard are district court findings underlying a determination that a

Harden v. TRW, Inc., 959 F,2d 201, 203 (l1th Cir. 1992) (quoting Brady v. Southern Ry.,
320 U.S. 476, 479 (1943)).
66. Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 334 (11th Cir. 1992).
67. 971 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied en banc 976 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1992).
68. 971 F.2d at 644-46.
69. Id. at 646.
70. Bankatlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1992).
71. Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708 (11th Cir. 1992),
72. Therrell v. Georgia Marble Holdings Corp., 960 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1992).
73. An appellate court may not affirm the district court's entry of a directed verdict if
the record contains substantial evidence opposing the motion. "A mere scintilla of evidence," however, is not sufficient to defeat the motion. Hasenfus v. Secord, 962 F.2d 1556
(lth Cir. 1992).
74. Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A. Inc., 965 F.2d 1014, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992).
75. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. City
of Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 1217, 1218 (11th Cir. 1992).
76. Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1992).
77. Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 159 (11th Cir. 1992).
78. Campbell v. United States, 962 F.2d 1579 (1lth Cir. 1992).
79. Abramson v. Gonzalez, 949 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
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statute of limitations tolled, 0 the finding that a plaintiff had failed to
establish an element of his Title VII81 claim,"' and the ultimate factual
findings of vote dilution8s under the Voting Rights Act.s" It is important
to note that the clearly erroneous standard does not bar the appellate
court from correcting the trial court's errors of law or findings of fact
based on misconceptions of the law.85
The appellate court draws a distinction between questions of pure fact
and mixed questions of fact and law, with the clearly erroneous standard
applied only to the former.8 6 Mixed fact-law questions are subject to the
same full review as are pure questions of law.87 One 1992 case concerning
the plenary review of a mixed question of fact and law was In re Grand
Jury Matter No. 91-01386. 8 The appellate court affirmed the district
court's determination that the attorney-client privilege was not violated
when an attorney was called upon to reveal names of two clients in an
effort to determine who had paid him with counterfeit money.8
In contrast to other standards, the appeals court will review any rulings
that are within the discretion of the trial judge under an abuse of discretion standard.9 0 As a practical matter, this means that only if an appellate
court is convinced that the court below was clearly wrong will it reverse a
discretionary decision. This narrow scope of review reflects the appellate
court's restraint from intruding on the trial process too readily, especially
when the trial judge may be in the best position to make the determination involved.
The court of appeals found a district court to have abused its discretion
in the case of Bailey v. Board of County Commissioners of Alachua
9 After setting out its approach for addressing a chalCounty, Florida.
80. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1992).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
82. Jones v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 977 F.2d 527 (11th Cir. 1992).
83. Hall v. Holder, 955 F.2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir. 1992).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.(1982).
85. 955 F.2d at 1566.
86. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 997 (lth Cir. 1992); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807, 809 (11th Cir. 1992).
87. In ruling that the district court had erred in relying on particular case law and consequently misapplied the law to the facts of the case, the court of appeals explained its review
stating: "The clearly erroneous standard does not govern an appellate court's review of district court findings made under a mistaken view of controlling legal principles. Such questions involve interpretations of law or applications of law to particular facts and are subject
to de novo review." Flagship Marine Servs., Inc. v. Belcher Towing Co., 966 F.2d 602, 604
(11th Cir. 1992).
88. 969 F.2d 995 (11th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 998.
90. See, e.g., Lee v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1416 (11th Cir. 1992).
91. 956 F.2d 1112 (11th Cir. 1992).
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lenge to a denied jury instruction, the court determined that it was an
abuse of discretion and prejudicial error for the lower court to refuse to
submit the civil rights defendants' requested instruction on damages to
the jury."

Other discretionary decisions of the trial court reviewed under this
standard in 1992 include the decision to terminate discovery, 3 denial of
class certification,' 4 evidentiary determinations," the decision not to or1
der separate trials on diverse issues," denial of motion for new trial,
denial of request for modification of consent agreement," denial of an
application for preliminary injunction," dismissal of ERISA claim for
failure to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies,100 and denial of
motion to file an amended complaint."'
A few of the "standard of review" cases do not fit neatly into any of the
three general categories discussed above. For example, the appellate court
has on occasion invoked the "plain error" doctrine and reversed a judgment because of an error in the proceedings even if the error was not
objected to at the time.' The doctrine encompasses those errors that are
obvious, that affect the substantial rights of the accused, and that, if uncorrected, would be an affront to the integrity and reputation of judicial
92. Id. at 1129. Quoting its decision in Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 920
F.2d 1560, 1569 (11th Cir. 1991), the court of appeals explained its approach in addressing a
challenge to a denied jury instrtuction as follows:
On appeal, we examine whether the jury charges, considered as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so that the jurors understood the issues and were not
misled. The trial judge's refusal to give a requested instruction is not error where
the substance of that proposed instruction was covered by another instruction
that was given. If a requested instruction is refused and is not adequately covered
by another instruction, the court will first inquire as to whether the requested
instruction is a correct statement of the law. In such a scenario, if the requested
instruction does accurately reflect the law, the next step is to assess whether the
instruction addresses an issue that is properly before the jury. Even if both of
these criteria are met, there must still be a showing of prejudicial harm that resuilted from the failure of the trial court to give the requested instruction before
the judgment will be disturbed on that ground.
93. Lee v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1992).
94. Jones v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 977 F.2d 527, 531 (11th Cir. 1992).
95. Bankatlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467, 1474 (11th Cir.
1992).
96. Bailey v. Board of County Comm'rs of Alchua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1127 (11th
Cir. 1992).
97. Hasenfus v. Secord, 962 F.2d 1556, 1562 (11th Cir. 1992).
98. Jacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 978 F.2d 1574, 1578 (11th
Cir. 1992).
99. Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1992).
100. Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 160 (11th Cir. 1992).
101. Abramson v. Gonzalez, 949 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
102. See, e.g., Mike Ousley Prods., Inc. v. WJBF-TV, 952 F.2d 380 (11th dir. 1992).
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proceedings. In Mike Ousley Productions, Inc. v. WJBF-TV,l0S the court
of appeals reviewed for plain error the issue of whether an attorney's due
process rights were violated by allegedly inadequate notice of a hearing
on a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against him; the attorney had failed to
raise the notice issue at trial. The court found no plain error since the
sanctions were imposed for filing a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis, and the court previously has ruled that "Rule 11 alone should
constitute sufficient notice of the attorney's responsibilities since the rule
explicitly requires 0 the attorney to certify that a complaint is well
1
grounded in fact." '
Review under the plain error rule is not so broad and all encompassing,
however, as to result in the reversal of a "district court's reasonable interpretation of an uncertain and evolving area of law."'' 15
Another unclassified standard of review is that employed by the appellate court when a party moves for a stay pending appeal of the district
court's order. In United States v. Hamilton,"° the court denied the appellant's motion noting that:
[tihe grant of a motion to stay the trial court's mandate is an exceptional
response granted only on a showing of "a probable likelihood of success
on the merits on appeal," or upon a lesser showing of a "substantial case
on the merits when the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of
granting the stay." '
IV. APPEALABILITY OF ORDERS GRANTING VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL, CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT BAR ORDERS, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
IMPACTING APPELLATE JURISDICTION

In McGregor v. Board of Commissioners of Palm Beach Countys08 the
court of appeals considered whether an order conditioning voluntary dismissal on payment of fees and costs was appealable by the movant. McGregor filed a civil rights action following his firing by the county defendants. The district court dismissed one count of his complaint for failure to
state a claim and McGregor subsequently moved for voluntary dismissal
on the remaining counts on the eve of trial. The county responded seeking attorney fees and costs as a condition of the dismissal. The district
court granted McGregor's motion, dismissed the action without prejudice,
and retained jurisdiction to determine a proper award of fees and costs.
103.
104.
105.
1992).
106.
107.
108.

952 F.2d at 383.
Id. (quoting Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Wood v. President & Trustees of Spring Hill College, 978 F.2d 1214, 1221 (11th Cir.
963 F.2d 322 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 323 (quoting Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986)).
956 F.2d 1017 (11th Cir. 1992).
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The lower court ultimately awarded fees and costs pursuant to Rule 11
and 42 U.S.C. § 988,101 as requested by the county. McGregor filed motions to amend the judgment and for rehearing, which the court denied.
He appealed.110
In an unusual procedural move, the court declined to review the order
of voluntary dismissal itself, yet considered the conditions that were imposed upon McGregor as a consequence of that order.' The court reasoned that the fees and costs award was not a condition of the dismissal
since the district court had retained jurisdiction to consider it at a later
time, and the relief was actually awarded in response to a subsequent
motion by the county."' Thus, it reviewed the conditions as entered in
the later order, over the objections of appellee.
Appellee argued that the court had no jurisdiction to consider any condition imposed upon McGregor in conjunction with the voluntary dismissal since he was not legally prejudiced.11 3 As a general rule, a plaintiff
14
cannot appeal an order granting his motion for voluntary dismissal. '
However, the appealability of a voluntary dismissal order depends upon
its effects, not its language, and an,appeal may lie even though the dismissal is without prejudice if the district court attaches onerous or prejudicial conditions.I 5 The court found that since the payment of fees and
costs was simply a possibility at the time the district court granted the
voluntary dismissal, not a condition of that dismissal, and in view of Mc109.

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1991).

110. 956 F.2d at 1018-19.
111. Id. at 1020-23. The court of appeals found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
prior involuntary dismissal of Count I of his complaint, and the order granting the voluntary dismissal because the appeal was untimely filed. An order granting voluntary dismissal
qualifies as a final order for purposes of appeal and McGregor's notice of appeal was filed
more than thirty days after entry of the dismissal order. Id. at 1020. Thus, the court concluded that the prior order of dismissal merged into the voluntary dismissal order and
neither could be appealed due to the late-filed notice of appeal.
112. Id.at 1020-21. The court found that the order awarding fees and costs was appealable even though the notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after its entry because
McGregor's motions functioned as a request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) for
alteration of the judgment, tolling the time for appeal. 956 F.2d at 1020-21. Judge Clark
disagreed with the majority and would have treated McGregor's motions as a request to
reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 956 F.2d at 1023. Judge Clark
argued that the prior order of voluntary dismissal was not a final order since the district
court retained jurisdiction to consider the fee and cost award and that an appeal should lie
from the order of voluntary dismissal. Id. The dissent appears to have the better reasoned
position and would avoid the tortured procedural result of allowing an appeal from a "freestanding" condition of voluntary dismissal.
113. 956 F.2d at 1021.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Gregor's consistent opposition to the award, it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.11
In a similar application of legal principles, the court of appeals addressed whether a party to a class action may appeal a part of a settlement agreement notwithstanding entry of a settlement bar order by the
district court. In In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litigation,"' federal oil and gas
investors filed a class action lawsuit, and the parties reached a settlement
with an insurance broker and the insurer of a company selling advisory
services to the investors. The insurer sought relief from the portion of the
settlement bar order s that precluded the insurer from seeking indemnity
from its broker. The insurer made no challenge to the remainder of the
settlement. In addition, the insurer had expressly reserved its rights to
appeal the disputed portion of the settlement."
The court recognized that public policy strongly favors the pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits, and that in many cases a settling defendant's appeal of a bar order would be problematic. 12 0 Nevertheless, the
court discussed several distinct features of the case at bench. The case
did not involve an "offset" issue in which the appellant seeks to ensure
that plaintiffs do not obtain a double recovery against nonsettling defendants in subsequent litigation.' Nor was this a situation in which the appellant had stipulated that the bar order was integral to the settlement
and waived the insurer's right to appeal, since the appellant made an express reservation of rights.' 22 Thus, the court concluded that by carefully
the
preserving its rights, the insurer "was entitled to both the benefit of
' 23
appeal.'
on
order
bar
the
to
challenge
continuing
a
and
settlement
Though not falling squarely within an exercise of appellate procedure,
the court of appeals in Brown v. Crawford County, Georgia'24 demonstrated its role as defender of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
invalidating the local procedures of a district court. The defendants in
the case were discouraged from filing motions for summary judgment
based upon absolute legislative immunity by virtue of a local rule that
116. id.
117. 967 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992).
118. Modern class action settlements are increasingly relying upon entry of a settlement
bar order that allows defendants to buy their peace without the risk that codefendants will
later attempt to shift their losses through cross-claims for indemnity, contribution, and
other causes linked to the underlying action. Id. at 494. In sum, a settlement bar order
allows the parties to fix the risks of settlement. Id.
119. Id. at 495.
120. Id. at 493-94.
121. Id. at 494,
122. Id. at 494-95.
123. Id. at 495.
124. 960 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1992).
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looked upon such motions with disfavor.125 The court of appeals invalidated the local procedure, which amounted to advance screening of summary judgment motions, and cautioned that motions for summary judgment were available to litigants as a matter of right."" The court
expressed its concern that the trial court permitted the case to continue
through the discovery phase of the litigation even though the absolute
immunity of the defendants should have shielded them from that
burden.

12 7

Finally, issues of ripeness and mootness may impact the jurisdiction, of
the court of appeals. Ripeness is a question of subject matter jurisdiction
that will be investigated whenever it appears to be lacking, even sua
sponte by the court. 2 8 The court of appeals decided two cases last year
that presented issues of ripeness.' 20 Both cases dealt with takings claims
under the federal due process clauses, an apparently evolving aspect of
the law.130 The cases focused on the availability of a federal cause of action in juxtaposition to state remedies and the timing of their use.
The court of appeals decided one case addressing mootness.' 3' The case
concerned an attempt by a federal agency to compel the defendant to
refrain from using minors as laborers in violation of the law. The opinion
applied the general rule that the voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal
conduct will not deprive a court of the power to hear and determine a
case. 2 2 The test of mootness is stringent in such circumstances and will
not be satisfied unless the proponent makes absolutely clear that the
wrongful behavior cannot reasonably be expected to recur.' 3

125. Id. at 1008.
126. Id. at 1009.

127. Id. at 1009-10.
128. Reahard v. Lee County, 978 F.2d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir. 1992).
129. Reahard v. Lee County, 978 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1992); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee
Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299 (l1th Cir. 1992).
130. If the reader is interested in a discussion of the limitations placed upon takings
claims based upon exhaustion of state remedies, the decision in Fields engages in an exhaustive consideration of the interplay between 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1966) and the Supreme
Court's holding in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In particular, failure to reserve the right to pursue a
federal remedy while prosecuting a state court action may bar later federal claims. 953 F.2d
at 1299.
131. Secretary of Labor v. Burger King Corp., 955 F.2d 681 (11th Cir. 1992).
132. Id. at 684.
133. Id.

